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At least four Bacillus anthracis–containing envelopes destined for New York City and Washington, D.C.
were processed at the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center (PDC) on September 18 and October
9, 2001. When cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a Trenton postal worker, the PDC was closed. Four
cutaneous and two inhalational anthrax cases were identified. Five patients were hospitalized; none died.
Four were PDC employees; the others handled or received mail processed there. Onset dates occurred in
two clusters following envelope processing at the PDC. The attack rate among the 170 employees present
when the B. anthracis–containing letters were sorted on October 9 was 1.2%. Of 137 PDC environmental
samples, 57 (42%) were positive. Five (10%) of 50 local post offices each yielded one positive sample.
Cutaneous or inhalational anthrax developed in four postal employees at a facility where B. anthracis–con-
taining letters were processed. Cross-contaminated mail or equipment was the likely source of infection in
two other case-patients with cutaneous anthrax.
n October 4, 2001, inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in
a Florida man who had no known exposure risk factors
(1). The following week, cases of cutaneous anthrax in persons
exposed to letters containing a suspicious powder were
reported in New York City. The initial investigation showed
that four envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores were
mailed through the U. S. Postal Service (USPS) to media out-
lets in New York City and senate offices in Washington, D.C.,
in September and October 2001. These four recovered enve-
lopes were postmarked at the USPS Trenton Processing and
Distribution Center (Trenton PDC) in New Jersey. 
On October 18, cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a New
Jersey postal worker. This prompted the closure of the Trenton
PDC and initiation of an investigation in New Jersey. The
objectives of the investigation were to determine the extent of
the anthrax outbreak in New Jersey, assess potential sources of
B. anthracis exposure, and prevent additional cases by devel-
oping and implementing control measures. 
Methods
Case Definitions
In this multistate outbreak, all sites adopted the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) case definitions for
anthrax (2). A confirmed case was defined as a clinically com-
patible illness that was laboratory confirmed either by isola-
tion of B. anthracis from an affected tissue or site, or by two
supportive laboratory tests. A suspected case was defined as a
clinically compatible illness with no isolation of B. anthracis
and no alternative diagnosis, but with one positive supportive
laboratory test or a clinically compatible illness epidemiologi-
cally linked to a confirmed environmental exposure to B.
anthracis. 
Supportive laboratory tests included demonstration of B.
anthracis in a clinical specimen by immunohistochemical
staining; detection of B. anthracis DNA by polymerase chain
reaction from specimens collected from an affected tissue or
site; or the presence of anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin
G (anti-PA IgG) by enzyme-linked immunoadsorbent assay (3).
Case Investigations
Suspected and confirmed case-patients were interviewed
about symptoms, employment, and other possible exposures,
and their medical records were reviewed. Coworkers and
supervisors were also interviewed. For case-patients who were
USPS employees, job assignments and time sheets were
reviewed, with special attention to dates when letters contain-
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ing anthrax spores were postmarked. Blood, tissue, and micro-
biologic samples were obtained and sent for testing. When
possible, the incubation period was defined as the time
between the date of likely exposure to spore-containing enve-
lopes and the onset of symptoms.
Surveillance
Initial case finding involved investigation of potential
cases reported by health-care providers, hospitals, and the pub-
lic directly to the health department. Subsequently, we initi-
ated stimulated passive hospital-based surveillance to identify
additional inhalational anthrax cases (4). Infection control pro-
fessionals from 61 hospitals in 15 counties in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware, serving an area of 6.7 million
residents, provided daily totals of emergency department and
intensive-care unit admissions and reported all patients meet-
ing broad clinical criteria (such as respiratory failure or febrile
illness without a confirmed alternative diagnosis) for possible
inhalational anthrax. Passive surveillance for both inhalational
and cutaneous anthrax cases was conducted statewide in New
Jersey and in parts of Pennsylvania and Delaware that are con-
tiguous to New Jersey. Surveillance was enhanced through
electronic communication with local health departments, press
releases, and postings on websites of the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) and two New
Jersey medical associations. All persons with possible anthrax
identified through surveillance were followed up through tele-
phone calls to the patients, the physicians and nurses treating
them, and requests for laboratory specimens.
Exposure Assessment
To identify locations where exposures to letters containing
B. anthracis spores might have occurred, we tracked the path
of the contaminated letters through the Trenton PDC by
obtaining information collected by the USPS for routine track-
ing and quality control. We also determined how mail flows to
and from the PDC as it is brought from and delivered to other
postal facilities and to the public.
Attack Rates
We reviewed the time sheets and specific work locations of
the PDC employees working on the night of October 9, when
the letters destined for Washington, D.C. were sorted. The
number of employees working on this shift and the number of
employees working on subsequent shifts were determined by
review of available records and interviews with the PDC post-
master. Some records remained unavailable for review because
the PDC was closed. We calculated attack rates for inhala-
tional anthrax by dividing the number of cases by the total
number of employees in the specified area.
Environmental Sampling
Initial sampling, conducted October 18–19, focused on the
identified path of the letters in the Trenton PDC and public
access areas of the PDC. When samples taken from areas
along the path of the letters were found to be positive for B.
anthracis on the following day, we developed a sampling strat-
egy to evaluate the extent of contamination in the building and
further characterize the risk to postal employees and visitors.
During October 21–November 9, sampling was conducted
in a wider horizontal distribution around the areas of the initial
positive samples and vertically upward toward the ceiling of
the PDC. Sampling was performed on machinery located
beyond the original path of the letters, the ventilation system,
lookout galleries (enclosed elevated corridors), administrative
areas on the mezzanine level, and the roof rafters. Sampling
techniques included swab sampling with sterile moist swabs to
collect settled dust and vacuum sock sampling with portable
HEPA-filtered vacuum to collect surface dust over large areas
(5). 
Other mail facilities in New Jersey through which the rec-
ognized contaminated letters could have passed were identi-
fied and sampled. Most samples from these facilities were
collected from areas where the initial mail-sorting activities
were conducted. Additional samples were collected from cus-
tomer areas, receiving bins of indoor mailboxes, cleaning
equipment, loading docks, ventilation systems, computer work
stations, and at least one delivery vehicle from each site. After
the identification of cutaneous anthrax in an office worker who
was not a PDC employee, sampling was performed at this
case-patient’s workplace and home; the focus was on areas
where mail might have been placed or opened. 
Laboratory
B. anthracis screening identification of human and envi-
ronmental samples was performed at the NJDHSS Public
Health and Environmental Laboratories according to Bioter-
rorism Laboratory Response Network Level A and B proto-
cols, with modifications to enhance the recovery rate of spores
from environmental samples (6,7). Agar slants with isolates
identified as B. anthracis by the Public Health and Environ-
mental laboratories were sent to CDC’s Anthrax Laboratory,
where identification of B. anthracis was confirmed by stan-
dard microbiologic procedures and the Laboratory Response
Network testing algorithm (6–8). Antimicrobial susceptibility
patterns were determined for B. anthracis isolates by using
National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards break-
points for staphylococci (9). Isolates of B. anthracis recovered
from clinical specimens and environmental samples were
typed to determine their genetic relatedness by using multiple-
locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) (10). 
Intervention
Postexposure prophylaxis was made available to poten-
tially exposed persons pending results of environmental test-
ing. We recommended continuation of postexposure
prophylaxis for a total of 60 days for persons considered to be
at risk for inhalational anthrax (11). A series of three postexpo-
sure prophylaxis clinic periods, each involving several ses-
sions, were organized at two local hospitals. Seven or 10 daysBIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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of antibiotics were dispensed at the initial clinic, and 25 days
of antibiotics were dispensed at each of the two follow-up clin-
ics. Hospital staff were available for consultation with persons
who could not attend the formal clinics. At the initial clinic,
ciprofloxacin was provided. The recommended antibiotic for
postexposure prophylaxis was changed to doxycycline for the
two follow-up clinics, after testing showed the B. anthracis
isolates were susceptible to doxycycline (12). Antibiotics were
obtained from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. 
Employees who did not attend the clinics were contacted
by telephone and encouraged to come to the clinic. To promote
adherence, fact sheets and a newsletter were developed and
distributed, reminders for postexposure prophylaxis clinics
were posted at work sites, and weekly meetings were held with
USPS management and representatives from each of the four
postal unions. A health education team conducted focus
groups with postal employees and conducted a health educa-
tion campaign.
Results
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of Cases
From October 18 to October 24, six persons with anthrax
were identified in the New Jersey area, including three with
confirmed cutaneous anthrax, one with suspected cutaneous
anthrax, and two with confirmed inhalational anthrax (Table
1). Their median age was 44 years (range 35–56 years); four
were women. Five were USPS employees; four worked at the
Trenton PDC, and one was a mail carrier at the West Trenton
post office. The sixth case-patient was a bookkeeper at a
Hamilton Township, New Jersey, office.
The incubation period was 5–9 days (median 8 days) for
the three cutaneous cases whose exposure date could be esti-
mated, and 5 and 6 days for the two inhalational cases. The
dates of onset were clustered: two case-patients had onset of
symptoms 8 and 9 days after the letters sent to New York City
were processed at the Trenton PDC on September 18, and four
case-patients had onset of symptoms 5–6 days after the letters
sent to Washington, D.C., were processed on October 9 (Fig-
ure 1). Five of the patients were hospitalized—both persons
with inhalational anthrax and three persons with cutaneous
anthrax. No case-patients died. Demographic and clinical
descriptions of the New Jersey case-patients are summarized
in Tables 1–3 and presented in detail elsewhere (1,12–14). 
Surveillance
Surveillance was initiated on October 24, and from Octo-
ber 24 to December 17, 2001, hospital infection control practi-
tioners reviewed 240,160 emergency department visits and
7,109 intensive-care unit admissions. Four hundred sixty-four
patients who met initial criteria for possible inhalational
anthrax were reported to the NJDHSS; 214 (46%) required
additional follow-up to rule out inhalational anthrax. Ninety-
eight patients with suspicious cutaneous lesions were reported;
26 (27%) were assessed further to rule out cutaneous anthrax.
Anthrax was ruled out in all patients; no additional cases were
identified (4). 
Exposure Assessment and Mail Flow
The Trenton PDC occupies 281,387 square feet (approxi-
mately 7 million cubic feet) and is divided into a mail-
Table 1. Characteristics of New Jersey case-patients in the bioterrorism-related anthrax outbreak, September–October 2002
Characteristic Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Sex Female Male Male Female  Female Female 
Age (yrs) 45 39 35 56 43 51
Cutaneous/ inhalational Cutaneous Cutaneous Cutaneous Inhalational Inhalational Cutaneous
Postal worker  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Employed at Trenton PDCa No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Date of illness onset 9/28 9/26 10/14 10/14 10/15 10/17
Incubation period  9 daysb 8 days 5 days 5 days 6 days Unknown
Hospitalized Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survived Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
aPDC, postal distribution center.
bAssuming exposure on 9/19.
Figure 1. Timeline of events during bioterrorism-related anthrax out-
break, New Jersey, September–October, 2001. Red box = l case-
patient with onset of inhalational anthrax; blue box = l case-patient with
onset of cutaneous anthrax.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1051
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processing area and administrative and public access areas.
Approximately 2 million pieces of mail are processed through
the facility each day. The recognized spore-containing letters
destined for New York City and Washington, D.C., took simi-
lar paths as they were processed through the facility. The let-
ters received a barcode on one of three advanced facer
canceller system machines (AFCS) and were then sorted
through one of two delivery barcode sorters (DBCS 70 and
71), high-speed machines that read the barcode and sort
approximately 30,000 letters per hour into bins according to
destination (Figure 2). The letters destined for New York City
were sorted through DBCS 70 or 71 in the late afternoon of
September 18. Both letters destined for Washington, D.C.
were processed in the late afternoon of October 9 through
AFCS 3 within approximately 15 minutes of each other, fol-
lowed by sorting on DBCS 70 within 2 minutes of each other.
After sorting, the letters were packed into trays in the packing
area and loaded onto mail trucks (Figure 2).
In general, mail that receives the Trenton postmark at the
Trenton PDC comes from one of 50 local post offices in cen-
tral New Jersey, or it is dropped off in a mailbox at the Trenton
PDC. We could not determine the source of the letters contain-
ing B. anthracis. After processing at the Trenton PDC, mail
with a Trenton postmark follows one of three routes:1) it is
returned to one of the 50 local post offices for local delivery;
2) it is transferred to one of 12 other PDCs in New Jersey,
Philadelphia, or Delaware; or 3) it is routed through the trans-
fer facility in Carteret, New Jersey or the airmail center in
Newark en route to destinations throughout the world. We con-
firmed that the recognized spore-containing letters were routed
through the Carteret transfer facility en route to their destina-
tions in New York City and Washington, D.C. At the Carteret
transfer facility, mail is not unwrapped or handled; it remains
in tubs that are transferred from one truck to another. 
Potential Case Exposures
Case-patient 1 (Table 1) was a mail carrier at the West
Trenton post office, which sends and receives its mail through
the Trenton PDC. She never worked at the Trenton PDC and
did not visit that facility. The mail that this carrier delivered on
Table 2. Initial clinical findings in four patients with bioterrorism-related 
cutaneous anthrax, New Jersey, September–October 2001a
Clinical finding
No. of cases with 
clinical finding
Physical findings
Edema surrounding skin lesion 4/4
Black eschar 2/4
Lesion associated with pustules or  vesicles 2/4
Tender 2/4
Pruritic 1/4
Laboratory results
Blood culture positive for Bacillus anthracis  1/4b
Blood or tissue positive for B. anthracis by PCR 2/4
IHC staining positive for B. anthracis  3/4c
Convalescent-phase serumd:  anti-PA IgG antibodies 
present  (“reactive serology”)
4/4
Initial diagnosis
Cellulitis 3/4
Insect bite 1/4
aIHC, immunohistochemical staining; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; anti-PA IgG, 
anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin G.
bOnly 1/4 patients with cutaneous anthrax had blood cultures drawn before the initiation 
of antibiotic therapy. This was the one patient with a blood culture positive for B. 
anthracis.
cThe 4th patient did not have tissue available for IHC staining.
dConvalescent-phase serum is serum drawn at least 14 days after symptoms begin.
Table 3. Clinical findings in two patients with bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax, New Jersey, September–October 2001a
Clinical finding Case 1 Case 2
Past medical history Transient ischemic attack None
Smoking status Nonsmoker Nonsmoker
Initial symptoms Fever, chills, vomiting, diarrhea Fever, chills, vomiting, dry cough, headache
Signs at ER visit Fever: temp=38.4°C; Tachycardia: HR=120/min; 
Hypoxia: arterial paO2=58 (RA)
Fever: temp=38.4°C; 
Tachycardia: HR=120/min; 
Hypoxia: SaO2=92% (RA)
Chest x-ray Infiltrate, pleural effusion Infiltrate, pleural effusion
Hospital course Re-accumulating hemorrhagic pleural effusions Re-accumulating hemorrhagic pleural effusions
Laboratory results
Blood culture Negative (before start of antibiotics) Negative (after 2 days of antibiotics)
Blood positive for  Bacillus anthracis  by PCR Yes (before start of antibiotics) No (after 2 days of antibiotics)
IHC staining of  pleural fluid
Cytology
Positive for B. anthracis cell wall
Positive for B. anthracis capsule
Positive for B. anthracis cell wall
Positive for B. anthracis capsule
Convalescent-phase  serumb Anti-PA IgG antibodies present Anti-PA IgG antibodies present
aER, emergency room; HIC, immunohistochemical; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; Anti-PA IgG, anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin G.
bConvalescent-phase serum is serum drawn at least 14 days after symptoms begin.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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September 19 had been sorted at the PDC on September 18 on
the same machines that had sorted the New York City letters
earlier that day. On September 28, 10 days later, cutaneous
anthrax developed in this mail carrier.
Case-patient 2 (Table 1) was a machine technician. He
worked on September 18, 2001, when the letters to the New
York City media outlets were sorted. This technician circu-
lated throughout the letter-sorting area, was responsible for
maintenance and repair of the high-speed sorters, and used
compressed air to blow out dust and debris from the machines.
Cutaneous anthrax developed in this man 8 days later.
Case-patient 3 (Table 1) was working on October 9, when
the letters containing B. anthracis bound for Washington, D.C.
were processed. Although he began his shift working in a dif-
ferent area of the facility, he later moved to operate the DBCS
70 that had sorted the letters containing B. anthracis earlier
that evening (Figure 2). Cutaneous anthrax developed 5 days
later.
The two New Jersey case-patients with inhalational
anthrax (Case-patients 4 and 5, Table 1) were also working on
the night of October 9. They stood side by side at the input
subsystem sorters, machines located next to the AFCS and the
DBCS that sorted the B. anthracis–containing letters (Figure
2). Inhalational anthrax developed in these case-patients 5 and
6 days later, respectively.
Case-patient 6 was a bookkeeper at a Hamilton Township
accounting firm; she did not visit the Trenton PDC. However,
mail delivered to both her home and workplace came directly
from the Trenton PDC without passing through an intermedi-
ate local post office. The bookkeeper’s onset of cutaneous
anthrax was October 17, eight days after the Washington, D.C.
destined letters were processed at the Trenton PDC.
Attack Rates for Inhalational Anthrax 
after Exposure to Washington, D.C.–Destined Letters
The two case-patients with inhalational anthrax (Case-
patients 3, 4, Table 1) were identified among 750 Trenton PDC
employees who worked in the processing area of the facility
during or after the letters addressed to Washington, D.C. were
processed on October 9 (overall attack rate 0.25%). The two
persons with inhalation anthrax were among 170 who worked in
the sorting area on the October 9 shift when the letters transited,
yielding an attack rate of 1.2% among sorting area workers. 
Environmental Sampling
Of the 137 samples obtained at the Trenton PDC, 57 (42%)
were positive for B. anthracis (Figure 2, Table 4). Positive
samples were located throughout the facility, including sam-
ples taken from rafters as high as 25 feet above the plant floor
and samples from the ventilation system (Figure 2). Twenty-
five (83%) of 30 samples were positive in the area where the
letters containing B. anthracis were sorted. Positive samples
were identified from the machines at which Case-patients 4
and 5 worked and from the sorting machine that processed
mail destined for the workplace and home of Case-patient 6. 
In addition to the samples collected at West Trenton post
office, we obtained a mean of 18 samples (range 4–27 sam-
ples) from each of the other 49 local post offices. Five of the
local post offices had one positive sample each. The positive
sample in each facility came from an area where mail from the
Trenton PDC is deposited. One of the samples was obtained
underneath a sorting machine, three were obtained from mail
containers or the place where mail containers are stored, and
one was from a bin inside a mailbox outside the post office.
All 57 samples collected from the West Trenton post office
Figure 2. Floor map of the Trenton Postal Distri-
bution Center in Hamilton Township with loca-
tions of environmental samples taken October–
November, 2001, and work stations of New Jer-
sey case-patients on dates when letters contain-
ing Bacillus anthracis were sorted. Blue man =
male, cutaneous anthrax; red woman = female,
inhalational anthrax.
*Machine mechanic worked throughout the mail-
sorting area the night the letters containing B.
anthracis destined for New York were sorted.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1053
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(where Case-patient 1 worked) were negative. All 14 samples
from the Carteret facility were negative. 
Of 21 samples collected from the workplace of Case-
patient 6, one grew B. anthracis. This sample was obtained
from a tray near the receptionist’s desk that held delivered and
outgoing mail. None of the samples collected from the home
of Case-patient 6 were positive, including samples collected
from her mailbox and areas where she stored and opened her
mail. 
Of the 10 environmental isolates typed by MLVA (4 from
locations throughout the Trenton PDC, 5 from the local post
offices, and 1 from the workplace of Case-patient 6), all were
indistinguishable from clinical isolates. 
Interventions
We recommended 60 days of postexposure prophylaxis for
1,069 employees of the Trenton PDC, as well as for persons
who visited the facility and spent >1 hour on the plant floor
from September 18 (the date the first letter containing B.
anthracis was processed in the Trenton PDC) to October 18,
2001 (the date the facility was closed). Beginning October 20,
a total of 885 (83%) Trenton PDC postal workers were pro-
vided with the full 60-day course of postexposure prophylaxis.
Of the 184 (17%) postal workers who did not receive 60 days
of antibiotics, 29 (3%) did not receive any antibiotics, 40 (4%)
came to the initial clinic only; and 115 (11%) came to the ini-
tial and first follow-up clinics. Most postal workers (1,032
[97%]) obtained their antibiotics from Hospital A; 37 (3%)
obtained antibiotics from their private physicians. 
Three hundred twenty-four visitors to Trenton PDC went
to Hospital A (n=175), Hospital B (n=129), or their private
physicians (n=20) for prophylaxis. Of these, 206 (64%)
received 60 days of antibiotics, 85 (26%) received <60 days,
and 33 (10%) did not receive any antibiotics.
Discussion
In New Jersey, B. anthracis spores contained in enve-
lopes processed on high-speed mail sorting machines were the
source of two cases of inhalational anthrax, four cases of cuta-
neous anthrax, widespread contamination of the Trenton PDC,
and cross-contamination of other letters, equipment, and facil-
ities. Several aspects of the New Jersey outbreak provide
insights into how these B. anthracis spores were distributed in
the environment, the clinical signs and symptoms they caused,
and the challenges to public health that arose in the setting of
intentional B. anthracis contamination.
Envelopes containing B. anthracis were handled at the
Trenton PDC in a limited area of the facility: they passed
through a small number of the many machines used to handle
letters. Yet environmental sampling found evidence of spores
throughout the facility, including on nearly all of the sorting
machines, in the ventilation system, and in the rafters high
above the plant floor. These findings are consistent with recent
experiments indicating that spores deposited on high-speed
sorting machines from the passage of B. anthracis–containing
envelopes can be readily aerosolized or dispersed through the
air and are capable of being carried for considerable distances
(15).
Despite evidence of distribution of spores throughout the
facility, the epidemiologic investigation demonstrated limited
disease. The attack rate among Trenton PDC workers for inha-
lational anthrax was low, despite the potential for ongoing
exposure during the 9 days between the afternoon the letters
bound for Washington, D.C. were processed and the day the
facility was closed.  The two workers in whom inhalational
anthrax developed stood next to one another when the letters
containing B. anthracis were sorted: they worked on machines
next to the sorters that processed these letters. Symptoms
developed in these workers within 1 day of each other. These
findings are consistent with an exposure to a local plume of
aerosolized spores during or soon after the passage of the let-
ters. Such a plume could have been produced by air circulation
patterns in the vicinity or when compressed air was used to
blow out or clean a nearby machine that had processed the let-
ters. We had no means of assessing individual exposure to
explore this hypothesis further. For example, all the >900 nasal
swabs collected from Trenton PDC workers were negative for
B. anthracis but were collected at least 10 days after the last
known letters were sorted in the facility, perhaps too long after
potential exposure to be useful indicators.
The Trenton PDC is the only facility identified in which
exposure to letters bound both for New York City and Wash-
ington, D.C. occurred, allowing for comparison between the
outcomes of these exposures. In New Jersey, only cutaneous
anthrax occurred after the letters to New York City were
sorted. Although we cannot exclude the possibility that the
Table 4. Environmental sampling results of bioterrorism-related 
anthrax outbreak, New Jersey, October–November 2001
Site
No. of 
samples Results
Trenton Postal Distribution Center
Entire facility 137 57 (42%) positive
Letter-sorting area 30 25 (83%) positive
Customer service area  (public area) 20 0 positive
Carteret Transfer Facility 14 0 positive
West Trenton Post Office 57 0 positive
Other 49 local post offices 983 5 (0.5%) positivea
1/72 positive POb #1 (1.4%)
1/19 positive PO #2 (5.3%)
1/15 positive PO #3 (6.7%)
1/18 positive PO #4 (5.6%)
1/24 positive PO #5 (4.2%)
Bookkeeper’s home 5 0 positive
Bookkeeper’s workplace 21 1 (4.7%) positive
aOne each at five distinct facilities.
bPO, post officeBIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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cases that occurred in temporal association with processing of
the Washington, D.C.–destined letters might have been
acquired from exposure to the New York City–destined letters,
both inhalational and cutaneous anthrax most likely occurred
in New Jersey after exposure to the letters to Washington, D.C.
Although only inhalational cases were reported in Washington,
D.C., these findings are consistent with the predominant forms
of anthrax that occurred following exposures to these letters in
New York City and Washington, D.C. (12,14). Many factors,
including differences in powder or other characteristics in the
contaminated letters, as well as differences in environmental
or other conditions at the various sites, might account for dif-
ferences in disease associated with the exposures to the New
York City– and Washington, D.C.–destined letters. Ongoing
studies of spore and envelope characteristics and aerosol for-
mation during routine mail processing activities might provide
further insight. 
Two of the six New Jersey cases occurred in persons who
did not work at the Trenton PDC and would not have had a
direct exposure to a recognized spore-containing letter at any
point in the known letter path. In both circumstances, we dem-
onstrated the opportunity for exposure to mail that could have
been cross-contaminated when spores deposited in sorting
machines or on other equipment were transferred to envelopes
subsequently processed in the facility. Although these cases
could possibly have resulted from unrecognized direct expo-
sure to envelopes containing B. anthracis, we consider expo-
sure to cross-contaminated envelopes to be the probable
source of these two cases. Consideration of the potential num-
ber of envelopes that might have been cross-contaminated in
this fashion gives an appreciation of the rarity of disease from
exposure to cross-contaminated envelopes. During the 9-day
period after processing of the letters bound for Washington,
D.C., before the facility was closed, at least 2 million letters
could have been sorted through the same machine that sorted
the spore-containing envelopes, and an estimated 18 million
pieces of mail would have been processed through the facility.
Yet only one case of cutaneous anthrax occurred among the
many thousands of USPS employees who handled mail that
had passed through the Trenton PDC, and only one case was
identified among the many millions of recipients of such enve-
lopes living in our surveillance area. Thus, the risk of anthrax
from cross-contamination, while not absent, appears to be
quite low.
Given the urgent public health actions that followed the
identification of each new case—from facility closures to rec-
ommendations for postexposure prophylaxis for hundreds—
surveillance played a crucial role in this investigation. We con-
tinued surveillance for 8 weeks after the last case had been
identified because the outer limit of the incubation period was
poorly defined, the extent that mail and other postal facilities
had been cross-contaminated was unknown, and there was a
possibility that additional B. anthracis–containing letters
would be posted or other terrorist events would occur. Thus,
surveillance was pivotal in demonstrating that the scope of the
outbreak was limited to the original cases identified and that
the risk to the general population was low. Surveillance also
provided a level of assurance that other attacks were not occur-
ring in the area and confirmed that additional public health
control measures were not needed. Surveillance also enabled
NJDHSS and CDC officials to maintain timely and frequent
communication with the health-care community, defined a
clear role for health-care providers and hospitals in the
response efforts, and provided assurance and consultation to
the health-care community and the public. 
Effective and frequent communication among postal work-
ers, hospital health-care workers, and NJDHSS and CDC staff
members also contributed to the high rate of initiation and
completion of postexposure prophylaxis in New Jersey. Some
studies have indicated that creating realistic patient expecta-
tions about side effects and enhancing patient understanding of
illness and treatment promote adherence (16,17). The three
postexposure prophylaxis clinics held in New Jersey enabled
postal workers to ask questions about anthrax, antibiotic regi-
mens, adverse effects associated with taking the antibiotics,
and ways to make taking prophylaxis more tolerable. Close
patient follow-up also promotes adherence (16,17), especially
when the course of treatment is long. In New Jersey, we made
telephone calls to postal workers who did not attend a clinic,
and hospital staff were available to see these workers for med-
ication refills outside the formal clinics. 
The New Jersey investigation highlighted unprecedented
and unanticipated challenges to public health posed by the
intentional release of a pathogenic biologic agent. An urgent
public health response led to the rapid development of diag-
nostic and environmental sampling methods that were refined
as the investigation progressed. The implementation of postex-
posure prophylaxis measures required the development of a
large-scale medication delivery infrastructure. Health commu-
nication messages were revised daily and often required com-
municating the uncertainty of risk through the lay media. The
possibility of further attacks with anthrax spores or other
agents of terrorism remains. Continued vigilance and close
cooperation among the various health, law enforcement, and
other groups and agencies, as well as continued support of
efforts to rebuild and update the public health infrastructure,
are needed to protect the public’s health. This relatively lim-
ited bioterrorism attack required considerable resources and
time from public health, health-care providers and hospitals,
and law enforcement. Further evaluation of the New Jersey
and other anthrax bioterrorism investigations may prove help-
ful in developing responses to future attacks.
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“I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work.”
–Thomas Alva Edison